By Daniel Nduka Okonkwo
Nigeria’s crude oil, one of its most valuable national assets and a critical source of federal revenue, is increasingly being committed to repay loans secured by successive administrations. Behind these billions of dollars in crude-backed financing lies a fundamental question: how much of the nation’s oil wealth has been pledged, what did Nigeria receive, what remains unpaid, and how much future production has been committed before the proceeds can benefit its citizens? NNPCL disclosures show that three major financing arrangements alone commit approximately 186,250 barrels of crude daily, with an estimated market value of ₦24.34 billion based on today’s exchange rate. This valuation is market-dependent, fluctuating with international crude prices and exchange rates; it is not a fixed repayment amount. At a time of rising living costs, unemployment, and mounting pressure on public finances, these commitments raise serious questions about Federation revenue, national development, and the financial burden being transferred to future generations. Nigerians deserve to know what was borrowed, what was surrendered in repayment, what remains outstanding, and whether the country received value for its commitments. This investigation examines the transactions, the unanswered questions, and the accountability obligations of successive governments and NNPCL.
Understanding the significance of the estimated ₦24.34 billion daily crude commitment requires distinguishing between historical borrowing and subsequent financing arrangements. The 186,250 barrels daily committed under Project Gazelle, Project Leopard, and Project Leopard II reflect facilities initiated between 2023 and 2025, against a longer history of crude-backed borrowing during periods of severe foreign-exchange pressure. The naira valuation is a market-dependent estimate based on the applicable international crude benchmark and exchange rate, not a fixed repayment amount. Examining how the earlier facilities were structured, drawn down, repaid, or refinanced is essential to establishing the full extent of Nigeria’s crude-backed obligations and avoiding double-counting across successive financing arrangements.
The central issue in Nigeria’s crude-backed borrowing is not simply how much money has been raised against oil. It is how much future production has been committed, what the country actually received, what financing and repayment obligations remain, and whether the transactions have reduced or postponed revenue belonging to the Federation. A national resource intended to finance public development is increasingly being used to secure present liquidity, leaving Nigerians with a responsibility to examine the obligations being transferred to future production.
An analysis of Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) audit disclosures and Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) financial statements, reported by The PUNCH in October 2024, identified seven crude-backed financing facilities valued at approximately $8.86 billion, secured against commitments of 272,500 barrels of crude oil daily. As of December 2023, approximately $6.97 billion had been drawn under these facilities. The report also identified $2.61 billion as repaid and $6.25 billion as outstanding against the facility portfolio. However, these figures require careful distinction: the $6.25 billion should not automatically be interpreted as verified outstanding principal on the amount actually drawn without reconciling the individual facilities, drawdowns, repayments, interest, and undrawn commitments. At 272,500 barrels daily, the commitments represent approximately 8.17 million barrels monthly, illustrating the scale of Nigeria’s historical exposure to financing secured against future crude oil production.
The historical portfolio comprises several distinct transactions initiated under former President Muhammadu Buhari. Project Eagle Export Funding included a $935 million facility in 2020, a $635 million tranche in 2021, and a $900 million third tranche in 2023. While the first two tranches were fully repaid by September 2023, the third remained outstanding as of NEITI’s 2024 reporting. Other transactions included Project Bison, a $1.04 billion facility obtained in 2021 against a commitment of 35,000 barrels daily, which was fully repaid on June 28, 2024; Project Panther, a $1.4 billion joint-venture financing facility secured in 2022 against 23,500 barrels daily; and Project Yield, which raised $950 million to support the Port Harcourt Refinery, backed by a commitment of 67,000 barrels daily. These transactions demonstrate how successive financing arrangements committed substantial volumes of Nigeria’s future crude production to meet borrowing obligations.
Under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Project Gazelle became a major crude-backed financing arrangement. Announced in 2023 with Afreximbank, the facility was publicly presented at approximately $3.3 billion, while NEITI recorded an initial $3 billion facility. It committed 90,000 barrels daily from Production Sharing Contract (PSC) assets. NNPC’s accounts identified the proceeds as an advance payment of future tax and royalty obligations due to the Federation from PSC assets managed by the company on its behalf. Its 2024 financial statements contain figures that demand careful reconciliation: the narrative describes a five-year ₦2.7 trillion funding arrangement, while the same disclosure records ₦4.9 trillion drawn against an initial facility of ₦5.1 trillion. It also records crude valued at ₦991 billion lifted in repayment and a balance of ₦3.8 trillion as of December 31, 2024. These figures should not be casually treated as equivalent measures. NNPC must explain the relationship between the original funding description, subsequent drawdowns, currency translation, and repayment balance.
The foreign-exchange crisis explains the liquidity pressure, but does not settle the question of value. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s 2022 Financial Markets Department report recorded $17.81 billion in interbank foreign-exchange sales, including $7.12 billion in spot and $10.69 billion in forward sales. Net sales after purchases were approximately $15.64 billion. The figures document the scale of intervention required, but short-term liquidity cannot resolve structural weaknesses.
Fiscal pressure was compounded by monetary financing. In December 2022, Buhari told the Senate that Ways and Means advances stood at approximately ₦22.7 trillion and sought approval to securitise ₦23.7 trillion over 40 years, with a three-year principal moratorium and 9 percent interest. Finance Minister Taiwo Oyedele has argued that previous fuel-subsidy regimes were partly sustained by borrowing against future crude. Royalties, production costs, and international oil companies’ entitlements also reduce the barrels available to the government. Gross production is not freely available government crude.
The constitutional question is unavoidable. Section 162 of the Constitution provides for revenues accruing to the Federation, subject to recognised exceptions, to enter the Federation Account for distribution among the three tiers of government. Where crude proceeds are committed to lenders or deductions occur before receipts reach the account, Nigerians need to know how distributable revenue is affected. It would be premature to label every facility a diversion of Federation funds; contractual structures differ. That is why the agreements, lifting records, deductions, and remittance treatment must be independently examined. The consequences extend beyond NNPC’s balance sheet to state allocations and public services.
Scrutiny has moved beyond public commentary. State finance commissioners raised concerns in 2024, and a House of Representatives committee called for stronger oversight. At its February 9–11, 2026, Enugu retreat, the Federation Account Allocation Committee Post-Mortem Sub-Committee demanded legislative scrutiny, disclosure, and forensic audits. Its communiqué, reported publicly on March 13, identified Project Gazelle and the Direct Sale Direct Purchase scheme and called for the Auditor-General’s access to relevant Federation Account information.
The exposure has since evolved. NNPCL’s 2024 and 2025 annual reports, analysed by LEADERSHIP in October 2026, identify three facilities, Project Gazelle, Project Leopard, and Project Leopard II, with combined crude commitments of 186,250 barrels daily. Over their five-year terms, these commitments represent approximately 340 million barrels, with a reported aggregate value of ₦11.2 trillion. Project Leopard was signed in December 2024, while Project Leopard II followed in December 2025. These figures must not be added mechanically to the historical $8.86 billion or 272,500-barrel portfolio because the reporting periods and facility positions differ, and Project Gazelle appears in both sets of disclosures. The overlap must therefore be reconciled to avoid double-counting. Nevertheless, the figures demonstrate the continuing scale of Nigeria’s reliance on financing secured against future crude oil production.
Production weakness magnifies the exposure. NEITI’s 2022–2023 audit report recorded 490.945 million barrels of fiscalised crude production in 2022, compared with 556.130 million barrels for 2021 in its comparative figures, representing an 11.7 per cent decline. Notably, NEITI’s original 2021 audit had reported 566.13 million barrels for that year, leaving a discrepancy of approximately 10 million barrels between the two publications that warrants clarification. The 2022–2023 report also recorded 21.145 million barrels attributed to theft and sabotage in 2022. When production is constrained by deferments, operational weaknesses, and crude losses, every barrel committed to debt repayment carries a greater opportunity cost for the country.
Value for money must be tested project by project. Project Yield was intended to support the Port Harcourt Refinery, yet it was reported in August 2024 that it had not commenced fuel production despite repeated postponements. Bison financed NNPC’s Dangote Refinery investment; Gazelle advanced future Federation tax and royalty obligations. Each requires a public account of the amount received, benefit delivered, financing cost, and crude surrendered. NEITI disclosed Project Panther terms of three-month SOFR plus 5.5 percent and a 1 percent liquidity premium. Project Yield had different tranche-based pricing, including LIBOR-linked terms. These costs should be assessed against alternative financing and the value of the pledged assets.
NNPCL and federal officials defend forward sales as commercial instruments that supplied liquidity during severe financing and foreign-exchange constraints. The Petroleum Industry Act 2021 established NNPC as a commercial company, but that status cannot extinguish accountability where national petroleum resources and Federation revenue are implicated. Nor does a financing agreement itself establish wrongdoing. The test is whether each transaction was authorised, transparently accounted for, commercially defensible, and beneficial.
The Buhari administration must account for facilities initiated during its tenure; the Tinubu administration must explain Gazelle and the Leopard arrangements. The National Assembly, Auditor-General, and NEITI should commission a forensic reconciliation of facility values, drawdowns, repayments, interest, outstanding principal, crude lifted, pricing, offtakers, deductions, and proceeds. Findings must be published so the Federation and citizens can verify the figures.
Nigeria must not mortgage its future without accounting for the present. Crude oil is a finite national asset, not an inexhaustible emergency fund for successive administrations. The decisive question is not merely how much financing was secured, but what Nigeria received, what it committed, what remains unpaid, and whether the country obtained value proportionate to the obligations imposed on its future production.
Daniel Nduka Okonkwo is an investigative journalist, human rights advocate, and policy analyst based in Nigeria. He is the founder and publisher of Profiles International Human Rights Advocate (PIHRA), a platform documenting the courage of human rights defenders and examining issues of governance, accountability, security, and fundamental rights.
His reporting on Nigerian governance, security-sector accountability, public finance, and human rights has appeared in Sahara Reporters, Vanguard, Daily Trust, African Defence Forum, Opinion Nigeria, and Daily Intel.
Read more of his work on the PIHRA website:
https://www.profilesinternationalhumanrightsadvocate.com.ng/
For tips, feedback, or collaboration, contact him at dan.okonkwo.73@gmail.com.






































