In the theater of criminal jurisprudence, there exists a thin, unyielding line between the preservation of courtroom decorum and the outright annihilation of a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial. When a trial involves capital offenses – where an individual’s life or liberty hangs permanently in the balance – that line becomes an absolute iron wall. In the ongoing legal saga of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, that wall did not just crack; it was utterly demolished.
When Justice Omotosho, on 20th November 2025, ordered Nnamdi Kanu to be forcibly removed from the courtroom, he may have believed he was stamping his authority on a volatile proceeding. However, by continuing the proceedings in Kanu’s forced absence, especially while the defendant had openly expressed his lack of confidence in the court and while no counsel was present to bridge the gap, the learned trial judge committed an egregious constitutional error.
The bedrock of Nigerian criminal justice is Section 36(6)(c) of the Constitution, which mandates that every person charged with a criminal offense is entitled to defend himself in person or by legal practitioners of his own choice. While statutory provisions like the Administration of Criminal Justice Act provide narrow windows for a trial to proceed when a defendant purposefully absconds, the rules radically shift when a defendant is forcibly excluded by the court itself.
The fatal error here lies in continuing a high-stakes terrorism and capital-offenses trial with an empty dock and an empty defense bench. The Supreme Court of Nigeria held in Adeoye v. State (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 605) 74 that: “It is a fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that a trial for a capital offense or serious felony must be conducted in the presence of the accused person. His absence, unless strictly permitted by law under exceptional misconduct where counsel remains to defend him, vitiates the trial.”
Keep in mind that Mazi Nnamdi Kanu was not just absent; he was sent out. And to compound the gravity of the ejection, Kanu had no legal counsel present to defend his interests during this forced ejection. Under Nigerian law, a trial judge cannot comfortably lock a defendant out of the room and simultaneously look past the total absence of a defense team to stand in for the defendant. Even when a defendant is expelled for disruptive behavior, the trial can only legitimately breathe through the lungs of his counsel.
In Galadima v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 610, the apex court emphasized that: “Where an accused person is unrepresented by counsel in a serious criminal trial, especially one touching on capital punishment or severe felony, any proceeding conducted in his absence and without the aid of legal representation is a nullity. The constitutional right to a fair hearing cannot be sacrificed on the altar of speed or administrative convenience.”
By forging ahead without Kanu and without a counsel for him, the court effectively turned an adversarial criminal trial into an ex-parte proceeding. What makes Justice Omotosho’s insistence on proceeding even more untenable is the explicit lack of confidence in him by Kanu prior to the ejection.
When a defendant forcefully raises a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judge’s primary duty is not to push forward to prove his stoicism; it is to take a pause. The Supreme Court in Deduwa v. Okorodudu (1976) 9-10 SC 329, held that: “A judge must be indifferent to the parties and should completely insulate himself from the heat of the battle. If there is a reasonable apprehension of bias raised by a party, the proper course of action, to preserve the untainted sanctity of the judiciary, is for the judge to recuse himself.”
Instead of resorting to an adjournment to allow tempers to cool, the judge over-reacted by expelling the very man crying foul, and then continuing with the proceedings. To the reasonable observer, the optics are disastrous: a judge clearing the room of a so-called troublesome defendant, then quietly wrapping up the case in the dark is very troubling.
Courtroom misconduct, perceived or real, by a defendant can be frustrating, and judges are human beings prone to exasperation. But the law provides tools to manage such situations, none of which includes conducting a capital trial while the defendant is locked in a holding cell and his defense table is completely bare.
Thus, Justice Omotosho’s decision to continue the proceedings under these precise conditions was perverse and represents a total collapse of due process that will surely shock the conscience of the appellate courts.
